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BODDIE AND BEYOND:
RIGHTS OF THE INDIGENT
CIVIL LITIGANT*
Introduction
T HIS CASE COMMENT shall be concerned with two cases which reflect
the growing recognition of the indigent's situation in relation to a
civil proceeding. The first of these cases is Boddie v. Connecticut.' This
Supreme Court decision was handed down on March 2, 1971. The case
involved welfare recipients and their constitutional challenge of a Con-
necticut law which required the payment of certain costs, about $60,
before an action for divorce could be commenced. These filing fees
were an effective bar to the petitioners' action. The Supreme Court, by
an eight to one majority, struck down this law as being violative of the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process.
The second case, In re Kras2 was decided on September 13, 1971
by the Eastern District Court of New York. It extended the Boddie
decision into the area of bankruptcy. The petitioner therein had to
support his wife, their two children, his mother and her young child
on $366 per month. Their only assets were $50 worth of essential house-
hold goods. Kras applied for a discharge in bankruptcy of his indebted-
ness but was effectively barred because he could not pay the necessary
filing fee. The court, relying on Boddie, decided that the fee require-
ment was repugnant to the Constitution.
History
The plight of the indigent in relation to the legal system has been
recognized down through the ages. Under Roman Law, where it was
necessary to provide security before proceeding in the courts, the pauper
* This article is a student work prepared by Armand J. Prisco, a member of the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEw and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
2 No. 71B972 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 1971).
was protected. "The law required of him
only such security as he could furnish."'3
There was not, however, either in Roman
or early English history, any comprehensive
statute to safeguard the poor person's
rights. In these times the indigent's "justice
appears to have been the King's preroga-
tive .. .. 4
In England the main barrier to the courts
were the writs, which could be obtained at
varying prices. While "there were some
writs which could be had for nothing, . . .
there were others which were only to be
had at high prices." 5 Yet, during this time
period (circa 1250) "[t]hat the poor should
have their writs for nothing, was an ac-
cepted maxim." 6 Indeed, the Magna Carta
contained a provision whereby no one
would be denied justice.7 And in the mid-
fourteenth century, statutes recognizing the
right of access to the courts were passed in
England. Their general import was that no
one could be imprisoned without process
of law,8 but the scope of protection gen-
erally was limited to criminal actions.
The cost of the writs was based on the
fee system, which was utilized in order to
pay the judges, other court officials, and
clerical help.9 The indigent could circum-
3 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV.
L. REV. 361 (1923).
4 Id. at 366.
5 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 195 (2d ed. 1899).
6 Id. (footnote omitted).
7 Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to
the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516, 519 (1968) [here-
inafter Litigation Costs].
s In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 379 (1970).
9 Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of
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vent this system if he "would swear that
he could not pay for entering his plead-
ings. . . ."10 The only fees that could be
waived at common law, however, were
those to be paid to "ministers of justice"
and "public officers.""
Until the late fifteenth century there were
no statutory provisions to facilitate the
poor person's claim in the court, i.e., there
was no method for the indigent to proceed
in forma pauperis.12 However, in 1445,
"[lt]he first comprehensive in forma pau-
peris legislation was . . . [enacted] . . . .
providing that one who proved his poverty
to the satisfaction of the chancellor could
have an original writ and writs of subpoena
without cost.' 13 The statute also provided
"that judges should assign attorneys and
counsel to act without fee."'1 4 After the
enactment of this statute, the only further
progress made during the next four cen-
Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 253, 255
(1968) [hereinafter Willging].
10 Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254, 1257, 3
Man. & G. 534, 542 (1841).
11 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046,
296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77-78 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey of New
York Practice, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 139 (1969).
12 Note, The Integration of Equal Protection,
Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right
of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV.
223, 226 (1970) [hereinafter The Integration of
Equal Protection]. Prior to this time some in
forma pauperis suits had developed in the ecclesi-
astical courts. See Note, The Right to Counsel in
Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1326
(1966) [hereinafter Right to Counsel].
13 Note, Proceedings In Forma Pauperis, 9 U.
FLA. L. REV. 65 (1956) [hereinafter Proceedings].
14 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
538 (2d ed. 1937).
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turies' 5 was expansion of the rights for
"assignment of counsel and forgiveness of
costs if the litigation proved unsuccess-
ful."1 6
The statute of 1494 did not encompass
the criminal area; its scope was limited to
civil litigation.17 Also, subsequent to the
statute, judges and other officials began re-
ceiving a fixed salary. Yet, the fee system
continued.18
The fee system was prevalent in the
United States throughout the colonial pe-
riod. After the revolution, state constitu-
tions granted judges and clerks a fixed
salary, but they continued to receive addi-
tional compensation through the fee system.
This condition was evident in the nine-
teenth century, and remnants of it still
persist.19 However, efforts were made to
help the indigent. By 1801, Virginia, Ken-
tucky, New Jersey and New York had some
form of in forma pauperis statute. 20 How-
15 Willging, supra note 9, at 256.
16 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046,
296 N.Y.S. 2d 74, 78 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968).
17 Bristol v. United States, 129 F. 87, 88 (7th
Cir. 1904); Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254,
1258, 3 Man. & G. 534, 544 (1841) (concurring
opinion).
18 Willging at 255.
19 Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Ap-
pointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil
Cases, 2 VALP. U. L. REV. 21, 28 (1967) [herein-
after Silverstein].
Remnants of the fee system can be seen today
in that many United States commissioners, pro-
bate judges, state sheriffs, constables, justices of the
peace, clerks and other official services still re-
quire them. Id. at 29. In fact, "[i]n Arkansas ...
some assistant prosecutors are compensated only
by fees." Id. at 28.
20 Id. at 29-30.
ever, absent a specific statute, "most courts
refused to recognize a right to sue in forma
pauperis.''2' And, even in the states which
adopted the statutes, the courts were reluc-
tant to apply them.22
Throughout the years there have been
recommendations that the "administration
of justice in civil areas be without charge to
the litigants. '23 But, they have had no great
effect upon the states. While it is true that
the majority of the states do have in forma
pauperis statutes24 in one form or another,
these are subject to a host of exceptions
and qualifications.25
In 1892 the federal government adopted
an in forma pauperis statute.26 This statute
is also subject to the same deficiencies
present in the state statutes, the main one
being that they do not cover the major ex-
pense of litigation. It is necessary to first
21 Id. at 31.
22 Id. at 30. This reluctance to apply the statutes
may have stemmed from the belief that "there
was no criticial need for such relief." This attitude
also was a factor in causing the American juris-
dictions to be slow in enacting the statutes. Pro-
ceedings, supra note 13, at 66.
23 Silverstein, supra note 19, at 22.
24 Many of these statutes were enacted due to
the increase in litigation caused by urbanization.
Proceedings at 66. It would seem that the critical
need for such statutes, which was previously be-
lieved to be lacking, had now been realized.
25 Silverstein at 33. The indigent's net worth or
the type of action that he is attempting to bring
may have a bearing on whether or not the statute
will apply. For example, Georgia and Louisiana
do not allow in forma pauperis proceedings in
cases of divorce. Id. at 34-35.
26 Willging at 256-57. The current version is 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
qualify under the terms of the statute before
being able to reap its benefits. 27
Constitutional Questions
The presence of in forma pauperis stat-
utes and the limitations imposed upon those
which have been passed, result in the denial
of access to the courts to indigents. This
gives rise to constitutional challenges under
the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. "[E]qual
protection and due process require the state
to provide its poor citizens the services
necessary for functioning in modern society
with an adequacy which will reasonably in-
sure their capacity for and access to equal
opportunity. '2s There are certain basic
principles which support this statement.
One such principle is the right to be heard.
This right is "one of the most funda-
mental requisites of due process. '29 It is a
settled principle, that a state must afford
27 Willging at 256-57. One of the most universal
qualifications deals with whether the applicant is
poor enough to invoke the statute. Generally, the
modern view has been much more lenient than
the earlier view. Silverstein at 45. Today's attitude
is that a person does not have to be totally desti-
tute in order to invoke the statute. As the Supreme
Court stated in Adkins v. Dupont Co., 335 U.S.
331, 339 (1948):
[T]o say that no persons are entitled to the stat-
ute's benefits until they have sworn to contri-
bute to payment of costs, the last dollar they
have or can get . . . would be to construe the
statute in a way that would throw its benefici-
aries into the category of public charges.
All that is necessary is a showing that because of
extreme poverty it would be impossible to pay
the necessary costs. Proceedings at 68.
28 Integration of Equal Protection, supra note 12,
at 256.
29 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208,
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to all its citizens a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. 30 A person is entitled "upon
the most fundamental principles, to a day
212 (1962). It existed in the common law also,
though mainly in the criminal law area. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 379 (1970). It had been
pointed out that no one was condemned without
first being given a chance to be heard by being
brought before the court. See Hovey v. Elliot,
167 U.S. 409, 415 (1896). Blackstone expressed
belief in the "rule of natural reason expressed by
Seneca,
'Qui statuit aliquid, parle inaudita altera,"
'A equain licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit.'"
Translated, this means that if a person decides
a case without hearing both parties, though his
decision might be just, he himself is unjust.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 279-80 (1st ed. 1769); see also
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-80 (1876);
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368-69
(1873); Capel v. Child, 149 Eng. Rep. 235, 242-
48, 2 C. & J. 558, 573-89 (1832).
This does not imply that there is any such
limitation on the right to due process in the Uni-
ted States. The Constitution provides that no state
"shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § I. There is no mention of
any distinction between due process in criminal
cases as opposed to civil actions.
30 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79
(1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anderson Nat'l Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Brinkerhoff-
Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930); Lon-
doner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177
U.S. 230, 236 (1900); Dorsey v. City of New
York, 66 Misc. 2d 464, 465, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129,
130 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 46
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (1971); see Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 153
(1941); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-
22 (1938); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
291 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1934).
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in court.. .. -31 This is based on the under-
lying theory that if a party's rights are going
to be affected, he must be granted the right
to be heard.32 If this is not done, then due
process is denied. Therefore, by creating
financial barriers to an indigent's cause of
action, the state violates his constitutional
rights.33
The right to obtain entrance to the courts
is essential to the right to be heard. It is the
"trigger [to] the application of equal pro-
tection and due process to certain kinds of
civil litigation by indigents. ' 34 That due
process and equal protection apply to "the
right to sue or litigate" is a principle that
has been recognized by the Supreme Court.35
This right to litigate increases in signifi-
cance according to the importance of the
right sought to be exercised or protected. 36
The more fundamental the right, the more
"classifications which might invade or re-
strain them must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined. '37 Access to the court
may be a fundamental right in itself, in that,
if it is denied, such would constitute an
abridgment of the first amendment's recog-
nition of the right to petition for redress of
grievances, which right is held applicable
31 Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413,
423 (1915); see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
328 (1921).
32 Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233
(1863).
33 Dorsey v. City of New York, 66 Misc. 2d 464,
321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
34 Integration of Equal Protection at 253.
35 Id. at 250; Dorsey v. City of New York, 66
Misc. 2d 464, 466, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
36 Integration of Equal Protection at 254.
37 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966).
to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. 38
As was stated previously, the specific
right to be protected may determine whether
the indigent will be allowed or denied free
access to the court. In the criminal area,
this has never been considered a stumbling
block. The court has been inclined to allow
an indigent to proceed when his personal
liberty was at stake.39 This always has been
regarded as a fundamental right. The ques-
tion which now arises is what shall be con-
sidered fundamental rights in the civil area?
It should not be inferred that if a funda-
mental right is involved, an indigent will
automatically be granted access to the
courts. The presence of a fundamental
right, however, necessitates that the state
or federal government show a compelling
interest in order to abridge that right. 40 In
38 La France, Constitutional Law Reform for the
Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J.
487, 513 [hereinafter La France] (The author of
this article was the counsel for the appellants);
Integration of Equal Protection at 253.
This whole idea of a fundamental right in rela-
tion to equal protection "had its genesis in cases
involving racial classifications." Id. at 238 n.56.
39 The following cases are indicative of how the
indigent has been protected in the criminal area.
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Williams v. Okla-
homa City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Hardy v. United
States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438 (1962); Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521
(1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565
(1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d
216 (1971).
40 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638
(1969), noted in 15 CATHOLIc LAW. 265 (1969).
the civil area, problems as to what is to
be regarded as a fundamental right have not
arisen, to any great extent, "where personal
liberty is involved and there is an imminent
threat of confinement as a result of the par-
ticular legal proceeding. '41 An example of
such a proceeding would be a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 42 Also, whether or
not a fundamental right is involved, the fact
that the court is the only vehicle for the
exercise of that right will cause the question




The rights of indigents in the civil area
have not been as liberally construed as
As was stated in this case, "any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of . . . [a
fundamental] right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional." Id. at 634 (emphasis in orig-
inal); see In re Kras, No. 71B972 (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 13, 1971).
In Integration of Equal Protection the author
recognized that
[t]he fundamental right-compelling state interest
rubric ... is a rule of judgment in which, in
the accommodation and balancing employed
when state classifications conflict with the exer-
cise of essential constitutional rights, the exer-
cise of the rights is given preference to the
realization of legitimate but not absolutely
essential state interests.
41 Id. at 244-45; Willging at 270.
42 See Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S.
192 (1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);
Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting).
43 In re Kras, No. 71B972 at 15 (E.D.N.Y., Sept.
13, 1971); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1087
(D. Colo. 1971); Dorsey v. City of New York, 66
Misc. 2d 464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1971).
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those of his counterparts involved in a
criminal action.44 It has been recognized
that "[t]here are distinctions between the
cases involving imprisonment . . . and the
ordinary civil actions. '45 There are varying
instances in which these distinctions can be
seen.
At the outset, there is the question of
whether a civil litigant has the right to
court-appointed counsel. The answer seems
to be no.46 However, "[p]ublicly supplied
44 Litigation Costs, supra note 7, at 254.
45 Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 973
(D. Conn.), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
46 Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967) [hereinafter Indi-
gent's Right to Counsel]; see Sandoval v. Rattikin,
395 S.W. 2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 901 (1966). But see Hotel Martha
Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66
Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1971).
The attempts to aid the indigent in this area
have not been very successful. Concern has crys-
talized into three general forms: "1) prohibiting
the use of an attorney [this step was taken in some
small claims courts]; 2) making the attorney un-
necessary [this device has been used by small
claims courts, domestic relations courts, adminis-
trative agencies, and in arbitration proceedings];
and 3) supplying an attorney or a lay advocate
[this procedure has been used in civil courts, ad-
ministrative agencies, and most importantly, in
the development of legal aid and service pro-
grams]." Willging at 259.
These measures have not, however, accom-
plished very much. The first has had very limited
application. The second has also failed, especially
in the small claims courts. These places have be-
come almost a collection point for creditors. The
creditor is invariably represented by counsel
while the indigent, who may be illiterate or com-
pletely unfamiliar with the workings of a court,
does not have this benefit. Id. at 259-60. The
third measure has also proved to be ineffectual
due to the tremendous increase in the number of
cases involving indigents, Right to Counsel, supra
note 12, at 1323.
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counsel may be provided as an adjunct of
the right to proceed with a civil case in
forma pauperis in the federal courts, and
in the courts of a few states," including
New York.47 But, since this provision is
usually part of the in forma pauperis stat-
ute, it is subject to the same infirmities. 48
Legal aid is not as helpful as one might be-
lieve in alleviating the problem. For example,
there are restrictions concerning eligibility. One of
the most severe is that based on subject matter.
The two most commonly restricted areas are di-
vorce and bankruptcy. Silverstein, Eligibility for
Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 U. DET. J.
URBAN L. 549, 572, 581 (1967).
Although the restrictions in the divorce area are
falling by the wayside there are still some legal
aid attorneys who believe ". . . that a divorce is
a luxury, thereby implying that none of the poor,
or only the most 'deserving' ones, should be en-
titled to get a divorce through legal aid." Id. at
574. The attitude regarding bankruptcy also runs
the gamut in legal aid offices; some would exclude
it altogether and others would accept it with little
restrictions. Id. at 581-82.
Inherent in any of these restrictions is the prob-
lem of funds. There is just not enough money in
legal aid to adequately supply the indigent with
counsel. To remedy this the legislature and the
courts must begin to act.
For a development of legal aid in England see
Dworkin, The Progress and Future of Legal Aid
in Civil Litigation, 28 MOD. L. REv. 432 (1965).
47 The Indigent's Right to Counsel, supra note
46, at 546. These states include Arkansas, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West
Virginia. Id. at 546 n.12. "Even a full right of
counsel should not be prohibitively expensive.
Most of the industrial nations of the world, less
wealthy than the United States, provide free legal
services to the poor." Id. at 551.
There are states which specifically recognize the
need for counsel in certain civil areas. For ex-
ample, "[in North Carolina an indigent person
is entitled to court-assigned counsel or a public de-
fender in a civil arrest and bail proceedings .. "
CCH [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. RPTR.
(New Developments) 10,093.
48 Silverstein at 49.
One would be subject to all the qualifica-
tions and limitations expressed in the stat-
ute in order to be eligible. The final decision
as to eligibility would then be subject to
the court's discretion4 9 and the court's con-
sent to proceed in forma pauperis with a
public supplied counsel is usually given
"grudgingly." 50 The consequence of this is
that "the existing in forma pauperis proce-
dures are used very little. . . ."-1 One must
also contemplate the value of such a pro-
ceeding if court-appointed counsel is not
granted. 52
This question is not a real problem in
the criminal area, especially in the case of
a capital offense.5 3 In a criminal proceeding
the right to counsel is deemed fundamental,
and if an indigent is tried without this aid,
49 Id. at 46-48.
50 Indigent's Right to Counsel at 546.
51 Silverstein at 43.
There are two main factors which tend to limit
the effectiveness of these statutes. They are: (1)
the limitations that are inherent within the stat-
ues, and (2) the conservative attitude of the
judges. Judges are recalcitrant "to entertain ac-
tions filed in forma pauperis." Id. at 44. There
has been, however, some reform in this area. The
most widely adopted reforms have been the pro-
visions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA). ld. at 32.
52 Indigent's Right to Counsel at 559.
53 In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932),
it was stated "that in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel . . . it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not
to assign counsel for him .. "
The courts have become considerably more
liberal in this view. In a recent New Jersey case,
it was held that an indigent defendant is entitled
to a court-appointed counsel in any case where im-
prisonment could result, including prosecutions
for petty offenses. Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58
N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971).
his fourteenth amendment rights are vio-
lated.54
Possibly a more serious question in the
civil area, because it actually bars access
to the courts,55 is the question of filing fees
and transcript costs. Also, in some types of
appellate action there is an equivalent to
filing fees in the requirement of posting a
bond for security before the appeal can be
taken. 50 In other cases a bond might be re-
quired before a defense can be asserted.57
In actions for replevin or where an "attach-
ment before judgment" is sought, a bond
will usually be required. 58 Copies of briefs
and transcripts necessary to the appellate
54 Accord, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). See Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565 (1957). This case recognized the right to
counsel on a criminal appeal. See also Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
It should be noted that the basis of the argu-
ment for right to counsel is concerned with how
to make the right to be heard more meaningful.
This is the principle that the courts should keep
in mind when deciding whether there is a right
to counsel.
Perhaps attitude toward the right to counsel in
the civil area may be justified on constitutional
grounds. It might be argued that since the
framers of the Constitution only provided for
counsel in the criminal area (sixth amendment),
they meant to deny this right in the civil area.
But, this contention seems fallacious. This was
provided for expressly, due to the inadequate
treatment that this area had received in England.
It had already been the practice in England to
recognize counsel in the civil area; therefore,
"there was no need to reaffirm to prerogative....
However, the effort to provide counsel for in-
digent civil litigants . . . has not been pursued in
the United States." Right to Counsel at 1327.
55 Indigent's Right to Counsel at 545.
56 Willging at 276.
57 Id. at 275-77.
58 Id. at 274, 277.
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process may cost hundreds of dollars, and
there are counsel fees and other expenses.5 9
This system of costs is a substantial barrier
to the courts for the indigent; therefore, he
may be denied the opportunity to be heard.
The predicament that these costs create
in the civil area is more extensive than that
which is present in the criminal realm. In
a criminal case the trial is initiated by the
government, and an attorney is supplied for
the indigent's defense. There are no filing
fees to be paid or bonds to be posted before
a defense can be asserted. However, prob-
lems have arisen on the appellate level. It
was held early that the in forma pauperis
statutes were not applicable to criminal ap-
peals. 0 Therefore, the cost of transcripts
and court records prevented indigent de-
fendants from appealing their convictions.
This inequity was finally remedied in the
landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois.'
Therein, the defendant could not afford a
copy of the transcript and court records
which were necessary to effectuate an ap-
peal. The United States Supreme Court held
that the rights of the indigent were in fact
being violated, for the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees "procedures in criminal
trials which allow no invidious discrimina-
tions between persons and different groups
of persons. '0 2 Moreover, the Court stated
that
to deny adequate review to the poor means
that many of them may lose their life,
liberty or property because of unjust con-
5) Id. at 279-80.
60 Bristol v. United States, 129 F. 87 (7th Cir.
1904).
61 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62 Id. at 17.
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victions which appellate courts would set
aside. 63
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, further
noted that "[i]f [the state] has a general
policy of allowing criminal appeals, it can-
not make lack of means an effective bar to
the exercise of this opportunity.
64
In interpreting this decision it must be
remembered that the Court was dealing
with a fundamental right; a man's liberty
was at stake. However, the philosophy of
the Griffin Court has been extended and
has become an important means for safe-
guarding the rights of indigents in the
criminal area. 65
In the civil area, the development of the
rights expressed in Griffin has proceeded
very slowly. The Supreme Court early
made it clear that "an act giving the right to
prosecute in forma pauperis cannot be ex-
tended by implication beyond its terms in
conflict with existing provisions in relation
63 Id. at 19.
64 Id. at 24. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257
(1959).
65 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (In both of these
cases an indigent's jail sentence was increased due
to his non-payment of a fine. The Court held this
type of law to be unconstitutional.); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Roberts v.
LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305 (1966); Hardy v. United States,
375 U.S. 277 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S.
674 (1958); Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521
(1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565
(1957) (These last four cases illustrate that in
order to effect a criminal appeal in forma pau-
peris, the defendant must exhibit good faith and
the appeal must not be frivolous. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1964)).
to writs of error and appeals."66 Therefore,
absent any express statute to proceed in
forma pauperis on an appeal, an indigent
would have to pay for his own transcript and
court record. This would be especially rele-
vant in a civil proceeding for a writ of
habeas corpus or a writ of error coram
nobis. This same general attitude prevailed
in the years immediately following the
Griffin case. For example, in 1958 a Cali-
fornia court held that a clerk was not re-
quired to prepare transcripts without the
payment of the statutory fee.67
The first breakthroughs came, predict-
ably, in cases where a civil procedure was
necessary in order to attack a criminal con-
viction. In Smith v. Bennett,68 where an
indigent prisoner could not afford a tran-
script to file for a writ of habeas corpus, it
was remarked that "to interpose any finan-
cial consideration between an indigent pris-
oner of the state and his exercise of a state
right to sue for his liberty is to deny that
prisoner the equal protection of the laws." 69
However, the Court limited its decision to
this type of civil action. 70 In Lane v.
Brown,71 where an indigent could not afford
a transcript in order to file for an appeal of
a denial of a writ of error coram nobis, the
Court stated that "[s]uch a procedure, based
on indigency alone, does not meet constitu-
tional standards. '72 Consequently, where
66 Bradford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243, 251
(1904).
67 Legg v. Superior Court, Los Angeles County,
156 Cal. App. 2d 723, 320 P.2d 227 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1958).
68 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
6-9 Id. at 709.
70 Id. at 713.
71 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
72 Id. at 485.
the purpose of the civil appeal is to de-
termine the question of liberty, the courts
should apply the Griffin philosophy.73
Recently, the states have begun to recog-
nize the right of an indigent to a free tran-
script in civil actions other than those
mentioned above. One such area has been
child custody cases. In Chambers v. District
Court of Dubuque County,74 an indigent
parent's rights in respect to her minor son
had been served. The court ordered a free
transcript to be issued due to the gravity of
the situation. In Brown v. Chastain,75 the
same facts were present as in the Chambers
case. The court dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. There was, however, a
spirited dissent by Judge Rives, who be-
lieved that the court did have jurisdiction
and therefore considered the case on its
merits. He found the criminal-civil distinc-
tion to be particularly repugnant in this
case. Judge Rives contended that "[w]e are
dealing here with rights just as fundamental
as a man's personal liberty. . . .Indeed,
there could hardly be a better case for Four-
teenth Amendment protection than this
one. '" It was his opinion that this was
72. See Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367
(1969); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385
U.S. 192 (1966); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959); Bates v. Lutrell, 2 CCH Pov. L. RPmR.,
1 13,448 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Shelby County 1971).
Professor McLaughlin had predicted, regarding
Griflin, that "[ilt was only a matter of time before
this development would percolate into the field of
civil litigation." N.Y. CIv. PRAc. § 1102, supp.
commentary at 110 (McKinney 1963).
74 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967). This
case also provided that counsel also should be pro-
vided at public expense.
75 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969).
76 Id. at 1027.
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another area to which the Griffin doctrine
should be extended. 77
Judge Rives reasoned that in this par-
ticular area, the right barred from protec-
tion is so fundamental as to make the
discrimination invidious. From this he con-
cluded that the right should be protected
according to the philosophy expressed in
Griffin. This apparently is the theory that
has been used by the courts in extending
to indigents waivers of certain fees and
costs in civil litigation. As was stated in
Lee v. Habid, "[i]t is the importance of the
right to the individual, not the technical dis-
tinction between civil and criminal, which
should be of importance to a court. 78
Prior to Boddie, the Supreme Court had
recognized certain rights to be fundamental
in the civil area, even though they did not
concern personal liberty. In Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections,79 the Court held
voting to be a fundamental right, and there-
fore found a poll tax, which barred the
complainant from exercising this right, to
be unconstitutional. The Court stated that
the poll tax created an invidious discrimina-
77 Id. at 1026.
Statutes, of course, could solve the problems
presented in granting a free transcript in a civil
appeal. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)(1965-
1969 Supp.), amending 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)
(1964), provides that fees for transcripts in civil
appeals in forma pauperis "shall . . .be paid by
the United States if the trial judge or a circuit
judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but
presents a substantial question)."
78 CCH [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] Pov. L.
RPTR. (New Developments) 1 10,882 at 11,701
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
79 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see Reynolds v. Simms,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Integration of Equal Pro-
tection at 237-38.
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tion on the basis of wealth and conse-
quently must fall. It also has construed the
right to travel as being fundamental, thereby
requiring the state to illustrate a compelling
interest in order to abridge it.80
Why this civil-criminal dichotomy exists
is a question that cannot be answered by
looking to the Constitution. The fourteenth
amendment simply provides that no state
"shall... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."''s It
makes no specific reference to either civil
or criminal proceedings. Indeed, Justice
Douglas has remarked that "the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not limited to criminal prosecutions.
Its protections extend as well to civil mat-
ters."
82
Expenses in Civil Litigation
This section will explore those expenses
which are predominately civil in nature.
They can be as effective an obstacle to the
indigent as filing fees and transcript costs.
They may effectively infringe upon the
paupers' rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The first of these expenses is bonds. A
party may have to put up a bond as a pre-
requisite to filing suit to appealing or even
to defending an action. In the 1921 case of
80 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966); see Lee v.
Habib, CCH [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] Pov. L.
RPTR. (New Developments) 10,882 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
Ownbey v. Morgan,8 3 the Supreme Court
held that a law which required an indigent
defendant to post security, in the amount
of the property attached, before contesting
the plaintiff's action, was not violative of
due process or equal protection. In Wil-
liams v. Shaffer,8 4 an indigent tenant failed
to pay his rent when due. His landlord then
sought a dispossessory warrant to evict.
The tenant desired to file a counter-affidavit
and thereby obtain a jury trial on the issues,
but, in order to accomplish this, a bond had
to be tendered as security. The Georgia
court found this to be constitutional and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Jus-
tice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, contended that this bond system
was inequitable because "the indigent
tenant is deprived of his shelter, and the life
of his family is disrupted-all without a
hearing-solely because of his poverty."8 5
In State v. Sanks8 6 the facts were similar to
those in Williams and the Georgia court
again found the bond requirement not to
be violative of equal protection or due
process. The court commented that the
payments are reasonable and "[tlhe fact
that a tenant in a particular case is indigent
and unable to furnish a bond does not per-
mit a different conclusion. 8 7 In most other
83 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
84 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
85 385 U.S. at 1038 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Certiorari was denied because the question was
considered moot due to the fact that the tenant
had already been evicted. Douglas contended that
this will always be the situation in this type of
action, and that the Court should therefore hear
the case. Id. at 1039.
86 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969).
87 Id. at 90, 166 S.E.2d at 20. The payments were
found to be reasonable because they helped to
civil actions the usual rule is that there is no
bond requirement to defend.88
Bonds may also be a prerequisite to
taking an appeal. "[A] supersedeas bond is
an almost universal prerequisite for ap-
peals" stemming from a summary evic-
tion.8 9 If the summary eviction does not
provide for a hearing, then the posting of
the bond will be the only manner in which
the indigent will be afforded an "oppor-
tunity for a judicial hearing. ' 9 ° The appeal
also could be contingent upon the payment
of a fee.9 This too could be an effective
bar to the indigents' use of the appellate
system.9 2 "The legal system, therefore, is
not providing the review of lower court
proceedings which is essential for the de-
velopment of justice and uniformity in the
law."93
This bond requirement is also present in
actions for replevin. This type of bond
could actually require "the indigent to be
able to pledge property worth double the
compensate the landlord for being denied his
premises and they deterred frivolous defenses to
a rightful dispossession. Id. at 91, 166 S.E.2d at
21. See Meltzer C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 225 Ga.
91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
954 (1971).
88 Willging at 274.
89 Id. at 276. See West Haven Housing Authority
v. Simmons, 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 250 A.2d 527
(1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 510, rehearing
denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970).
90 Willging at 276.
91 Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D.
Conn. 1969), vacated, 402 U.S. 937 (1971).
The federal court held that the $7 filing fee
required before an appeal could be taken was
constitutional. They believed that "the state may
limit access to its civil courts" in this way. 296 F.
Supp. at 1322.
92 Silverstein at 36.
03 Integration of Equal Protection at 233.
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amount of the goods to be replevied in ad-
dition to payment of the other fees. Thus,
in practical terms, replevin is a remedy
which is unavailable to him." 94 In this area
a Florida court held that absent a specific
provision in the statutes for waiver, a writ
of replevin, unaccompanied by a bond, was
properly dismissed. They determined that
the certificate of insolvency was imma-
terial. 95
For the indigent plaintiff, the cost of
filing fees may likewise act as an effective
bar to exercising his rights. Without the
payment of these fees, he could not com-
mence his action. However, before dealing
with filing fees, which were the main issues
in Boddie and Kras, it is necessary to first
consider the question of auxiliary expenses
i.e., those payable by litigants to third per-
sons other than public officers. There are
thirty-four jurisdicitons including the fed-
eral government, which have in forma
pauperis relief.9 6 The courts and statutes
of these jurisdictions, however, "are too
often silent about the unofficial costs of
civil litigation."9 7 These auxiliary fees con-
sist of the costs incurred for witnesses,
expert witnesses, depositions, publication,
investigatory services and of course, coun-
94 Willging at 274.
95 Coonts v. State of Florida, CCH [1968-1971
Transfer Binder] Pov. L. RPTR. (New Develop-
ments) 9483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1969). See Tamburro v. Trama, 59 Misc. 2d 488,
299 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Westchester County Ct. 1969)
(poor person unable to post undertaking, not per-
mitted to retain chattels during pendency of re-
plevin action).
96 Comment, In Forma Pauperis and the Civil
Litigant, 19 CATH. U. AM. L. REV. 191, 196
(1969).
97 Id. at 191.
BODDIE AND BEYOND
sel. 98 Without some type of system for the
payment of these fees, the courts cease to
be accessible to the indigent.99 The need for
a provision to aid the indigent in paying
for these expenses "was recognized in the
American Bar Committee's Model Poor
Litigant's Statute of 1924-25 and the
same Committee's recommendation in
1941.... ."100
One troublesome aspect in this area is
the fact that many of these costs are not
within the control of the court. And,
"[elven those expenses which can be con-
trolled by the court are usually surrounded
with due process problems which preclude
their being waived unless there are funds
available to the court to pay for the services
rendered the poor."' 0'
Recently, some inroads have been made,
but they have not been sufficient to allow
a pauper open access to the courts. In a
1967 case it was held that granting leave
to proceed in forma pauperis does not mean
that the court should give any affirmative
assistance to the indigent in securing a dis-
covery deposition.102 In reference to witness
08 Id. at 198.
9 Silverstein at 25.
A further inequity also is pointed out by this
article. It deals with the fact that courts usually
only convene during the week. If a person is
indigent, he needs all the time possible to work
in order to make money. He can not afford to
give up a full day's effort in order to go into
court. Id.
100 Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
101 Civil Litigant, supra note 96, at 198.
102 Beard v. Stephens, 372 F. 2d 685, 690 (5th
Cir. 1967). The fact that of an indigent's "inabil-
ity to pay for a deposition may mean the loss of an
essential witness or it may make it impossible to
solidify favorable testimony or to impeach an im-
fees, however, a recent New York decision
declared that "[w]hile no provision of law
exempts a poor person from paying a wit-
ness his fee . . . , failure to provide for pay-
ment of such fees by the city or county
would deny an indigent party effective and
equal access to the courts."'1 03
In matrimonial actions the cost of publi-
cation can prevent the indigent from pur-
suing his action.' 04 "Since the largest per-
centage of litigation by indigents is in
domestic relations," application of in forma
pauperis would have an "immediate and
dramatic impact for the poor."'1 5 Prior to
the decision in Boddie, this problem was
recognized and dealt with in a New York
case. 10 The issue was whether these publi-
cation costs could be waived and paid for
out of the public treasury. The court de-
cided that these fees were not within the
poor persons statutes'0 7 and "that unless
portant adverse witness." Integration of Equal
Protection at 233.
103 Hotel Martha Washington Management Co.
v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 834, 322 N.Y.S.2d
139, 140 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 46
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. - (1971).
104 Integration of Equal Protection at 232. See
Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1971).
105 Integration of Equal Protection at 231.
106 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296
N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1968),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 139 (1969).
107 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 1101, 1102 (McKinney
1963) as revised (1966).
The court pointed out that because of the com-
prehensive poor persons statutes in New York
there was never much urgency in connection with
auxiliary fees. But, since the adoption of a more
liberalized divorce law the problem of publication
had now arisen. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d
74 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
constitutionally mandated the courts do not
have the inherent power to direct payment
of this category of 'auxiliary expense' out
of public funds."'u 8 However, the court di-
rected the fees to be paid out of public
funds because otherwise the plaintiff's right
to equal protection of the laws would be
violated. 09 The court also implied that the
plaintiff's right to a divorce in this case was
as fundamental as the transcript in the
Griffin case or the right to vote in the Har-
per case." 0 Influencing the decision was the
fact that in order to obtain relief, for the
divorce, petitioner was required to go into
the courts.' Three years later the New
York courts were confronted with the same
problem and again decided that these pub-
lication fees denied the indigent plaintiff her
rights under the equal protection clause, as
well as under the due process clause." 2
A more comprehensive system is needed
in order to help defray these auxiliary costs
if we are to allow the pauper to proceed in
a civil action. These fees contribute toward
the pauper's present condition. He is, in
108 58 Misc. 2d at 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
109 Id. at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
110 Id. at 1054, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
111 Id. at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
The court stated that
[tihe loss of access to the courts in an action for
divorce is a right of substantial magnitude when
only through the courts may redress or relief be
obtained.
Id.
112 Dorsey v. City of New York, 66 Misc. 2d
464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1971).
The court in this case remarked that if an in-
equality exists, even if accidental or unintentional,
and "if it affects substantial rights of the poor,
[it] violates equal protection to the same extent as
does intentional, hostile, aggressive and invidious
discrimination." Id, at 466, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
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fact, being exploited because of his sta-
tus.n
a
The last area of court costs to be dis-
cussed will be those of filing fees. These
fees are usually covered by in forma pau-
perts statutes. 114 Problems arise in states
where there is no statute and in certain
cases where there is a question as to
whether the statute covers the particular
subject matter. Whether the fees will be
waived is influenced by the presence or
absence of a fundamental right. Tradi-
tionally, divorce has not carried this weight.
As a result, the filing fee requirement in
divorce actions has not been considered an
abridgement of any constitutional right.1 5
The states also were considered to have
legitimate reasons for imposing the fees,
i.e., to financially support the courts and
to deter frivolous law suits." l For example,
in Sloatman v. Gibbons" 7 the court held
that filing fees could not be waived in a
divorce action but could be paid for in in-
stallments. Consequently, absent a statute,
it was infrequent that filing fees were
waived in a divorce action.
In bankruptcy proceedings the filing fees
are much more costly than those for di-
113 The Integration of Equal Protection, at 234-
35.
The indigent is being injured in landlord-tenant
relationships, in consumer frauds, in problems
with finance companies, etc. If these people be-
lieved that the indigent had an opportunity to go
to court and air his grievances, the "possibilities
of unofficial relief or negotiated settlement are
greatly enhanced." Id. at 234.
114 Civil Litigant at 191.
115 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968
(C.D. Conn. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
116 286 F. Supp. at 973.
117 104 Ariz. 429, 454 P.2d 574 (1969).
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vorce. Yet, they may not be waived. "The
best an indigent debtor may hope for is
that the fee will be ordered paid in install-
ments.""u 8 Prior to 1946, this was not the
case. An indigent then could have filed and
proceeded in forma pauperis if he also pre-
sented an affidavit which stated that he
could not afford the filing fee.119
Thus, these filing fees, bond require-
ments, transcript costs and auxiliary ex-
penses all face the indigent before he even
begins his legal proceeding or even before
he has a chance to defend or appeal a legal
action brought against him. His only hope
is that these fees might be waived or paid
for out of the public exchequer.
Boddie v. Connecticut
In Boddie,120 the Court was confronted
with an indigent who had been denied ac-
118 Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma
Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (1969) [here-
inafter Proceedings in Bankruptcy].
119 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 51.01 (14th ed.
1971).
The law as it pertains to in forma pauperis pro-
ceedings in federal court is contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1964). We are concerned with the federal
law here because the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.
If the bankrupt is lucky enough to be able to
pay the filing fee in installments, he still must be
very careful. If he "misses a payment, his petition
will be dismissed." It "is probably res judicata as
to all provable scheduled debts .. " His only
escape now from wage garnishment, attachment
and repossession would be to file a " 'Wage Earner
Plan' under Chapter XVIII of the Bankruptcy Act
[Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-86, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86
(1964)]." One problem, however, still remains.
In order to obtain the "Wage Earner Plan," a per-
son must pay a $30 filing fee "and there is no
provision authorizing waiver of this fee for the
poor." Proceedings in Bankruptcy, supra note 118,
at 1204.
120 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
cess to a Connecticut court due to failure
to comply with the statutory requirement
of a filing fee. Appellant sought to have the
fee waived so that she could commence an
action for divorce. Connecticut had no in
forma pauperis statute.' 2 1
Boddie was initially argued in December
of 1969 and reargued in November of
1970.122 At the initial argument, the ap-
pellant relied on the Griffin line of cases to
establish a violation of equal protection. It
was contended that Griffin was not limited
to criminal matters and that the fourteenth
amendment is equally applicable to both
civil and criminal cases.123
Appellants also reasoned that the state's
basis for imposing the fees did not justify
its discrimination.1 24 It was further con-
tended that since the basis for the discrim-
ination was poverty, a compelling state
interest was a precondition to justify the
classification. 125 The due process argument
also was based on the denial of access to
the court. This claim of right was linked to
the first amendment's protection, applied
to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, "of the right to petition for redress
of grievances .... ",126
These two arguments were distinguished
in that due process was much narrower,
dealing only with "the right to seek a hear-
ing in court," and that, "[w]hile the equal
121 Civil Litigant at 206.
122 La France, supra note 38, at 511.
123 Id. at 511-12.
124 Id. at 512. "Appellants argued that the need to
conserve funds, to raise additional funds, or to
discourage frivolous litigation did not justify the
State's discrimination." Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 513.
protection argument might fail if the inter-
est involved was not significant or serious
enough to be constitutionally cognizable,
. . . any denial of the right to petition for
redress was constitutionally cognizable.
"127
On reargument the appellants placed the
main thrust of their argument on the due
process clause.' 28  They contended that
since the right to marriage had been recog-
nized as constitutionally fundamental by
the Supreme Court, the state could not dis-
criminate on the basis of wealth in a di-
vorce proceeding. 129
The Supreme Court finally handed down
the Boddie decision on March 2, 1971. By
an eight to one majority, they reversed the
district court's decision and found that "due
process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to
its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages.""130
Justice Harlan wrote the majority opin-
ion for the Court. He stated that due pro-
cess typically has been concerned with the
rights of defendants and not those "seeking
access to the judicial process in the first
instance."'131 He believed, however, that
"marriage involve[d] interests of basic im-
portance ... 132 and noted that the courts
were the only legal means if one wished to
dissolve a marriage. Therefore, these plain-
127 Id.
128 Id. at 515.
129 Id. at 516. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
130 401 U.S. at 374.
131 Id. at 375.
132 Id. at 376.
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tiffs were put in the same position as the
defendant who was "called upon to defend
his interests .... For both groups this
process was not only the paramount dis-
pute-settlement technique, but, in fact,
the only available one." 133
Justice Harlan further reasoned that due
process requires that one must be given, "a
meaningful opportunity to be heard," un-
less there is an overwhelming state interest
to be protected. 13 4 He could not find such
a state interest and therefore concluded that
the state's conduct constituted a denial to
the appellants of their right to be heard in
violation of due process.13 5 Justice Harlan
further believed that the Griffin philosophy
was applicable in this case. He reasoned
that since the fees in Boddie were imposed
as a prerequisite to access to court, and the
transcript in Griffin "could be waived as a
convenient but not necessary predicate to
court access," the principles expressed in
Griffin certainly should be applicable. 36
Justice Harlan also made reference to
service of process. He stated that "in this
case service at defendant's last known ad-
dress by mail and posted notice [was]
equally effective as publication in a news-
paper."113 7 "The implication [of this is] that
an indigent plaintiff may effect service by
mail if a state declines to arrange it for
him.' 13  Mailing was considered a "reliable
alternative . . . to service of process by a
133 Id. at 376-77; See La France at 520.
134 401 U.S. at 377.
135 Id. at 380-81.
136 Id. at 382.
137 Id.
138 La France at 521.
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state-paid sheriff if the State is unwilling to
assume the cost of official service. '"u '
In Boddie, Justice Brennan and Justice
Douglas submitted concurring opinions.
Justice Douglas would have preferred a de-
cision based more directly on the principles
in Griffin.140 He disagreed with the reliance
placed on the due process clause and the
subjective test involved. As he stated,
"[flishing may be [as] important [as di-
vorce] to some communities.' 14 1 He con-
tended that there have been formulated
equal protection guidelines, i.e., race, pov-
erty, alienage, religion, and class or caste,'142
and implied that Boddie was consistent with
such guidelines.' 43
Justice Brennan believed that
[i]f fee requirements close the courts to an
indigent he can no more invoke the aid of
the courts for other forms of relief than he
can escape the legal incidents of marriage.
The right to be heard in some way at some
time extends to all proceedings entertained
by courts.14 4
He did not think that the distinctions
drawn by the Court as to marital and other
actions would survive. 45 Justice Brennan
further contended that the Boddie case pre-
sented "a classic problem of equal protec-
tion of the laws" and should be decided
under the rationale of Griffin.' 46
139 401 U.S. at 382.
140 Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring).
142 Id. (Douglas, J., concurring); La France at
522.
143 See La France at 522.
144 401 U.S. at 387-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 388.
146 Id.; see La France at 522.
The lone dissenter in the case was Justice
Black. It was his position that since "mar-
riage and divorce have always been con-
sidered to be under state control," the states
should have the power to charge this nom-
inal cost in order to initiate such a proceed-
ing. 147 He further believed that Griffin
should not be extended to the civil area.148
Implications of Boddie: In re Kras
One month after deciding Boddie, the
Supreme Court considered several cases
which dealt, in varying degrees, with the
principles espoused in Boddie. Of these
cases the Supreme Court denied certiorari
to five, 14 9 remanded two for reconsidera-
147 401 U.S. at 389-90 (Black, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 390 (Black, J., dissenting).
In support of his position Black relied on Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
This case involved a stockholder's derivative ac-
tion under which a statute, required stockholders
who held less than 5% or $50,000 market value
of the stock to post security so that, if unsuccess-
ful, they could pay the reasonable expenses of the
trial. This provision of the law was challenged as
being violative of due process and equal protec-
tion. The Court held that it was not, stating that
"it is within the power of a state to close its courts
to this type of litigation if the condition of reason-
able security is not met." Id. at 552. It was Black's
contention that the only difference between Cohen
and Boddie was that the latter involved a mar-
riage and that this did not justify a different hold-
ing. 401 U.S. at 392-93 (Black, J., dissenting); La
France at 523.
149 In re Garland, 402 U.S. 966 (1971) (concern-
ing "the right of a bankrupt to file a petition for
discharge in bankruptcy without payment of the
...statutory fee." 402 U.S. 954); Bourbeau v.
Lancaster, 402 U.S. 964 (1971) (involving an
indigent who lost a civil case, "and who [could
not] afford to pay the fees for docketing an ap-
peal." 402 U.S. at 955); Kaufman v. Carter, 402
U.S. 964 (1971) (dealing with "an indigent
mother [who] was denied court-appointed counsel
tion in light of Boddie,150 and granted cer-
tiorari to one.' 5 '
Surprisingly, it was Justice Black, the
only dissenter in Boddie, who vehemently
objected to the Court's failure to take this
opportunity to extend it. He would have
granted certiorari to all these cases.152 He
believed that the Boddie case could only
rest on
one crucial foundation-that the civil
courts of the United States and each of the
States belong to the people of this country
and that no person can be denied access
to those courts, either for a trial or an ap-
peal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance
a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an
attorney. 153
to defend herself against a state civil suit to de-
clare her an unfit mother and to take five of her
seven children away from her." 402 U.S. at 955);
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954
(1971) (seeking to declare unconstitutional a law
which provided that if "a tenant ... [fought] his
eviction by resort to the judicial process [he
risked] the penalty of a judgment for double the
rent due during the litigation if he loses." 402
U.S. at 954-55); Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enter-
prises, Inc., 402 U.S. 936 (1971) (concerning an
indigent who could not "post the penalty [bond]
required to appeal from [an] adverse [judgement]
in [a] housing-eviction [case]." 402 U.S. at 955).
150 Sloatman v. Gibbons, 402 U.S. 939 (1971)
(in this case the lower court had decided that a
divorce filing fee could not be waived. All that it
permitted was to schedule the payments in install-
ments. 402 U.S. 954); Frederick v. Schwartz, 402
U.S. 937 (1971) (involving an indigent who lost
a civil case, "and who [could not] afford to pay
the fees for docketing an appeal." 402 U.S. at
955).
151 Lindsey v. Normet, 402 U.S. 941 (1971)
(concerning an indigent who could not "post the
penalty [bond] required to appeal from [an] ad-
verse [judgment] in [a] housing-eviction [case]"
402 U.S. at 955).
152 402 U.S. 954, 955 (Black, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 955-56 (Black, J., dissenting). Black
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In re Kras,"4 a bankruptcy proceeding,
was the first extension of the principles ad-
vanced in Boddie. The federal district court
in New York first had to consider whether
the indigent petitioner would be allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis according to sec-
tion 1915(a) of title 28; and thereby avoid
attacked the two criteria, which the majority had
established in Boddie, that would have to be met
before a state must grant open access to its courts.
The first of these elements was that the court had
to be the only means for resolution of the dispute.
He believed this to be "no limitation at all." It is
evident, he continued, that
the State holds the ultimate remedy in almost
every property dispute. . . . Likewise, contracts
are valuable only because society will enforce
them. . . . Thus, the judicial process is the ex-
clusive means through which almost any dis-
pute can ultimately be resolved short of brute
force.
Id. at 956-57 (Black, J., dissenting).
The second element was that the dispute had to
involve a fundamental interest. Black contended
that if the Court is extending this fundamental in-
terest to divorces, which "is simply not very
'fundamental' in the hierarchy of disputes," then,
"almost every other kind of legally enforceable
right is also fundamental to our society." Id. at
957-58 (Black, J., dissenting). Black further con-
tended that Boddie should be extended to encom-
pass the costs of appeal and also the right to
counsel. Id. at 958-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
Douglas also dissented on the denial of certio-
rari. He believed that this accentuated the difficul-
ties with the position taken by the majority in
Boddie. Douglas contended that the fundamental
interest test which the majority had required, was
wrong, and that "[w]hen indigency is involved...
there is [no] hierarchy of interests." Id. at 961
(Douglas, J. dissenting).
154 No. 71B 972 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 1971).
In Delaware ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. 13,406 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971), de-
cided after Boddie, the court refused to waive an
appeal bond in the case of an indigent. "The ap-
peal bond was held to be a jurisdictional require-
ment governing the right of appeal from a justice
court, and therefore, a judge could not waive
requiring it." Id.
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the filing fee. The court rejected this ar-
gument because Congress had eliminated
bankruptcy proceedings in forma pau-
peris.155 The best that could be hoped for
was that the payments be allowed in install-
ments. 156
The court then considered whether this
filing fee violated the indigent's right to due
process or equal protection. Judge Travia,
who decided the case, was faced with two
recent and conflicting decisions in this area.
The first of these was In re Garland,15
wherein the bankruptcy filing fee was up-
held as constitutional. The Garland court
did not believe that a bankruptcy discharge
is a fundamental right.' 58 It added that
the Congressional requirement of the pay-
ment of a $50. fee before receiving a dis-
charge [does] not arbitrarily discriminate,
but [bears] a rational relation to the service
offered and to the bankrupt's need for that
service.159
The court also held that to be classified an
indigent for bankruptcy purposes, a person
had to be " 'destitute,' with the exception
of assets specifically exempt."1 60
155 No. 71B 972 at 7.
156 Id. at 8.; see note 119 supra.
157 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 966 (1971).
158 Id. at 1188.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1187.
The court was skeptical of persons that sought
waiver of these fees. It did not believe that much
was at stake. According to the court, there were
only two types of assetless persons who would
want a discharge in bankruptcy. The first-de-
serving of no consideration-were those who had
assets and wanted to hide them. The second were
those who did not have assets, but wanted to pro-
tect future assets from creditors. The court stated
The second case was In re Smith.161
Therein, the court held that the bankruptcy
filing fee, when applied to indigents, did
violate equal protection. The court did not
find bankruptcy to be a fundamental inter-
est in itself, but believed that when it was
combined with the question of access to
the courts, it took on "greater signifi-
cance. '"162 This required the state to show
a compelling interest if the fee was to stand.
Since this was not accomplished the fee
was waived.' 63
Unlike Garland and Smith, however, the
Kras case was decided subsequent to the
Boddie decision. Judge Travia, in addition
to relying on Boddie, also depended on the
dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in
the denial of certiorari in the group of cases
which arose immediately after Boddie.
Judge Travia concluded that a discharge in
bankruptcy was a fundamental right. As
Black stated, "the need . . . to file for a
discharge in bankruptcy seems to me to be
more 'fundamental' than a person's right to
seek a divorce."'1 64 Agreeing, Justice Doug-
las, analogized dissolution of marriage to
obtaining a fresh start in life through bank-
ruptcy proceedings. According to this rea-
soning, any violation of this right would
that this claim was not so compelling that the
state must grant a free discharge. Id. at 1188.
161 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
162 Id. at 1087.
163 Id. at 1090-91.
It was also observed, however, that the
petitioners obligation to pay the filing fee is not
permanently discharged but would arise again
if and when she is no longer indigent and can
pay the fee without undue hardship.
Id. at 1093.
164 402 U.S. at 958.
have been a violation of equal protection
of law.'65
Consequently, Judge Travia believed
that this filing fee did violate the peti-
tioner's right to due process and equal
protection.' 6 He failed to find a counter-
vailing state interest which was of such
magnitude as to justify the abridgment of
the pettitioner's right, 16 7 and, therefore,
deemed the filing fee waived.
Conclusion
The indigent may suffer substantial dam-
age because of the many financial barriers
which impede his access to the courts.
These costs frequently bar [him] from en-
forcing his rights against substandard hous-
ing, retaliatory eviction, unconscionable
contracts, usurious loans, foreclosures and
repossessions, arbitrary administrative ac-
tion denying or terminating statutory bene-
fits, invasions of privacy, and the like. 168
Boddie accomplished two advances for
the indigent. The first is that the filing fees
in divorce cases must be waived if they are
an effective bar to entrance to the court; the
second, the provision for an indigent to
165 Id. at 961.
166 No. 71B 972 at 14.
167 The court concluded that the fee was not
necessary to the operation of the bankruptcy sys-
tem and that, in fact, the entire basis of the bank-
ruptcy fee system was unsound. Therefore the
government's interest in the fee was not compel-
ling on this basis. Id. at 18-19.
Lastly the court found that there was no basis
for fear of frivolous claims. The bankruptcy sys-
tem already had an adequate deterrent to this, i.e.,
the effect of a bankruptcy action bars by res
judicata any attempt to satisfy the scheduled
debts in any other action. Id. at 21.
168 Litigation costs at 517-18 (footnotes omitted).
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mail notice to the defendant of an impend-
ing divorce action if he cannot afford the
cost of publication and if the state has not
arranged for it or other suitable notice.169
But, further progress must be made, with
Boddie as the foundation. Kras built on this
foundation, but only to a limited extent.
The Supreme Court had a golden oppor-
tunity to extend Boddie in the cases which
followed it. Yet, they chose not to do so.
Do they believe, as Black stated, that the
Boddie principles "can only be enforced
slowly step by step, so that the country will
have time to absorb its full import?"'170
This would be a painful approach. The
indigent cannot afford to wait. Not only
may he be hurt individually, but he may
also be injured as a member of a class.
These litigation "costs may have a substan-
tial impact on the conduct of test litigation
and may tend to foreclose broad law re-
form through law suits.''
There are, however, areas in which it
may be reasonable to expect an extension
of Boddie. It may find acceptance in cases
which concern domestic status, such as le-
gal separations, annulments, child custody
and adoption. 7 2 It may also be expanded,
within a reasonable time, into those areas
where the court is the only place in which
relief can be sought.
If the Boddie and Kras decisions are to
have real significance, their philosophies
must be brought to bear upon the many
auxiliary and often extremely costly ex-
169 La France at 532.
170 402 U.S. 954, 956 (Black, J., dissenting).
171 Integration of Equal Protection at 236.
172 La France at 534-35.
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penses. And, it is essential that the right to
counsel be extended to the indigent in a
civil action.' 73
173 In this respect it should be realized that if all
else has been financed, the amount of confusing
paper work and the awesome size and appearance
of the court may be a substantial deterrent to the
indigent. Concern towards giving the indigent a
meaningful right to be heard is, therefore, also of
great importance in this area.
In order to accomplish these ends, it will
be necessary for the Supreme Court to af-
ford to all persons their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protec-
tion.' 74
174 See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court
1968 Term, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 7 (1969).

